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Abstract
Part I describes Hart’s view of the primary and secondary rules that are necessary for the
existence of a modern legal system. Part II examines his view of international law, as resembling a
primitive legal system. Part III evaluates the GATT legal system according to Hart’s criteria for a
modern legal system, while Part IV will do the same for the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
Part V will conclude with an evaluation of the WTO legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1948, at the second meeting of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES' to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade2 ("GATT") in Geneva, the delegation of the Netherlands
asked the Chairman of the session, Dana Wilgress of Canada, to
rule whether the most-favored-nation obligation of Article I of
the GATT applied to consular taxes. On August 24, 1948, the
Chairman ruled:
[I]n response to a request for an interpretation of the phrase
"charges of any kind" in paragraph 1 of Article I with respect
to consular taxes, the Chairman ruled that such taxes would
be covered by the phrase "charges of any kind."'
With this single sentence report of the ruling from the
Chairman, the GATT dispute settlement system was born.4 That
system, as it evolved, was hardly sophisticated. "[O] n the tree of
legal evolution," Robert E. Hudec wrote more than forty years
later, "GATT's adjudication machinery is still down at the level
studied by legal anthropologists, right alongside dispute resolu-
tion ceremonies practiced among primitive societies."5 As a le-
gal system, GATT dispute settlement shared most of the deficien-
cies of public international law that have been noted to support
arguments that international law is not really "law." H.L.A. Hart,
in The Concept of Law, observed that primitive law and interna-
tional law are foremost among the examples usually given of
* Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Washington, D.C. I would like to thank
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, William J. Davey, Robert Howse, Celso Lafer, Petros C. Mav-
roidis, and Niall P. Meagher for comments on an earlier draft.
1. In GATT parlance, the term CONTRACTING PARTIES in upper case generally re-
fers to the parties acting collectively as an organization; with initial capitals or in lower
case, the term usually refers to individual parties.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
3. The Phrase "Changes of Any Kind" in Article I:I in Relation to Consular Taxes, Aug.
24, 1948, GATT B.I.S.D. (vol. II) at 12 (1952).
4. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DI-
PLOMACY 75 (2d ed. 1990).
5. Public International Economic Law: The Academy Must Invest, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 5, 6 (1992).
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doubtful cases when the question, "What is law?" is asked.6
Hart went on to note the familiar: international law lacks a
legislature, states cannot be brought before international courts
without their prior consent, and there is no centrally organized
effective system of sanctions. Certain types of primitive law, in-
cluding those out of which some contemporary legal systems
may have gradually evolved, similarly lack these features.7
Hart contends that modern municipal legal systems consist
of two different kinds of rules: primary rules and secondary
rules. The presence of highly developed secondary rules, in
Hart's view, distinguishes a mature legal system from both its
primitive counterpart and from international law. This Essay will
evaluate GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization'
("WTO"), utilizing Hart's criteria in an attempt to answer the
questions: did GATT-and does the WTO-legal regime more
closely resemble a primitive legal system or a modern municipal
legal system?
Part I will describe Hart's view of the primary and secondary
rules that are necessary for the existence of a modern legal sys-
tem. Part II will examine his view of international law, as resem-
bling a primitive legal system. Part III will evaluate the GATT
legal system according to Hart's criteria for a modern legal sys-
tem, while Part IV will do the same for the WTO.9 Part V will
conclude with an evaluation of the WTO legal system.
I. HART'S LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Internal and External Viewpoints
If anthropologists from Mars were to alight on earth and
6. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 1994).
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
9. Hart's positivist jurisprudence has provoked strong dissent. See, e.g., LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 133-51 (revised ed. 1969); see also, RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 16-45 (1980). It is not the purpose of this Essay to enter into
that debate, other than to note that Hart seems to have had the better of it. For an
analysis that concedes some of Dworkin's points, but generally supports Hart, see NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 229-64 (1978). It has been noted
that the disagreement between Fuller and Hart, which preceded and continued after
publication of The Concept of Law, "was as much cultural as intellectual." RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 230 (1990).
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observe our behavior, they would note that when the lights at
intersections turned from green to red, we earthlings generally
stop our cars; when the lights turn back again from red to green,
we move our cars through the intersections. The Martian an-
thropologists might conclude that this behavior is in response to
a rule that we observe, but they would not look at the rule as one
that applied to them. They would view the rule "externally." We
earthlings, in contrast, look at the rule as one that applies to us;
we stop and start our vehicles in response to the rule. We view
the rule "internally."
The same point may be made using the example of sports.
To those who play a sport, the rules apply to them, and they act
in accordance with the rules. They may be said, in Hart's terms,
to view the rules of the game internally. An outsider, particularly
a person seeing a game for the first time, looks at the rules dif-
ferently. "Three strikes and you're out" is a rule that applies in-
ternally to batters in baseball; to someone who has never seen
the game before, it is merely an explanation of why a player left
home plate and walked dejectedly back to the dugout. A legal
system, as Hart describes it, presupposes an internal point of
view."0
B. Varieties of Laws
One of Hart's major objectives was to dispel the simplistic
notion that laws simply are a system of orders backed by threats.
Certainly law contains what may be described accurately as or-
ders backed by threats, criminal laws being the primary example.
But, Hart asks, what about laws that confer powers on private
individuals to make wills, contracts, or marriages? What about
laws that empower judges to decide cases? What about laws that
empower others, such as legislators, to make new laws? What
about laws that delegate legislative authority to an administrative
agency?'1 To say that laws like these are orders backed by threats
is an over simplifying distortion. 2 Hart avoids this distortion by
describing a modern municipal legal system as a fusion of what
he calls "primary rules," some of which may be in the form of
10. HART, supra note 6, at 91. For an elaboration of Hart's internal point of view,
see MACCORMICK, supra note 9, at 275-92.
11. HART, .supra note 6, at 26.
12. Id. at 79.
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orders backed by threats, and "secondary rules" that are not in
this form.
1. Primary Rules
All legal systems, however primitive or sophisticated, have
what Hart calls "primary rules." These are rules to be obeyed,
such as rules against violence, theft, and deception. 3 A society
with only primary rules, however, will face problems because
these disparate primary rules do not amount to a "legal system"
in the modern sense of the term. They simply are a collection of
separate standards, resembling rules of etiquette. Should doubts
arise as to the precise scope of a given rule, there is no proce-
dure available for obtaining an authoritative interpretation. Pri-
mary rules are difficult, if not impossible, to change except per-
haps slowly, over time. Disputes as to whether a rule has been
violated will be frequent and often interminable, for no authori-
tative system exits to ascertain the fact of a violation. 4
2. Secondary Rules
The answer to these problems, Hart writes, is to supplement
primary rules with secondary rules. "[W] hile primary rules are
concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not
do," he explains, "secondary rules are all concerned with the pri-
mary rules themselves. They specify the ways in which the pri-
mary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, elimi-
nated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively deter-
mined."" Hart describe three kinds of secondary rules: (1)
rules of recognition, (2) rules of adjudication, and (3) rules of
change. The addition of these secondary rules, in Hart's view, is
"enough to convert the regime of primary rules into what is in-
disputably a legal system. ''"6
a. Rules of Recognition
Perhaps the term that is best known from Hart's theory of a
legal system is "rule of recognition."' 7 This is a secondary rule
13. Id. at 91.
14. Id. at 92-93.
15. Id. at 94.
16. Id.
17. Hart sometimes uses the singular, rule of recognition and sometimes the plu-
ral, rules of recognition. Whether, in Hart's view, a given legal system must have only
2000]
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that "is accepted and used for the identification of primary rules
of obligation. " 18 Hart avoids the problem of an infinite regress
(how is the rule of recognition itself recognized?) by casting it as
a matter of fact in any legal system. From the internal point of
view, from the point of view of someone who accepts a particular
legal system, "it is seldom formulated; it is used."' 9 From the ex-
ternal point of view, a non-member of a group* or society may
observe the rules members follow and ascertain the rule of rec-
ognition by observation. For example, Hart notes that "[i]t is
the law that" is an internal statement. In contrast, "[i]n England
they recognize the law as" an external statement.20 Both, how-
ever, are statements of fact, using a rule of recognition to iden-
tify the laws in a particular system.
Because rules of recognition are used to determine what
rules are valid within a legal system, they will differ from system
to system. In the United States, the validity of a regulation is-
sued by an administrative agency normally would be determined
by reference to a statute delegating authority to the agency.
From the internal perspective, that may suffice, although this
does not appear to be what Hart is speaking of when he speaks
of a rule or rules of recognition. He seems to mean more than
simply a law that authorizes another law. Thus, when the validity
of the statute itself comes into question, the Constitution be-
comes relevant. The Constitution probably is the rule of recog-
nition in the legal system of the United States, since there is no
looking behind it. Those who function within the system look
no further-they do not challenge the validity of the Constitu-
tion itself. Lawyers use the Constitution as a basis for their argu-
ments; judges use it as a basis for their decisions.2 t
Hart is careful to say that the rule of recognition is not as-
sumed or postulated or hypothesized. Those who use a system
indeed "presuppose" rules of recognition, but these presupposi-
tions are not assumptions, postulates, or hypotheses as those
one rule of recognition or may have several is not clear. See, e.g., id. at 94-95, 100-02,
108-09.
18. Id. at 100.
19. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
20. Id.
21. "[S]urely an English judge's reason for treating Parliament's legislation (or an
American judge's reason for treating the Constitution) as a source of law having
supremacy over other sources includes the fact that his judicial colleagues concur in
this as their predecessors have done." Id. at 267.
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terms are normally used. These presuppositions consist of two
things:
First, a person who seriously asserts the validity of some given
rule of law... makes a rule of recognition which he accepts as
appropriate for identifying the law. Secondly, it is the case
that this rule of recognition, in terms of which he assess the
validity of a particular statute, is not only accepted by him but
is the rule of recognition actually accepted and employed in the gen-
eral system. If the truth of this presupposition were doubted,
it could be established by reference to actual practice: to the
way in which courts identify what is to count as law, and to the
general acceptance of or acquiescence in these identifica-
tions. 2 2
Since the existence and identity of a rule of recognition in a
legal system is a question of fact, there is no rule providing for its
validity. It either exists or it does not exist; we do not assume,
postulate, or hypothesize that it exists. We presume that it exists
and we act on that presumption. To say that we assume, but
cannot demonstrate, the validity of the rule of recognition, Hart
states that "is like saying that we assume, but can never demon-
strate, that the standard metre bar in Paris which is the ultimate
test of correctness of all measurements in meters, is itself cor-
rect.
' 23
b. Rules of Adjudication
In a system with only primary rules, the members themselves
must determine whether a rule has been breached, much as the
players in a sandlot baseball game, without an umpire, deter-
mine whether the batter is out. In the absence of an authorita-
tive determination, any system much more complex than a sand-
lot baseball game is likely to degenerate into chaos or worse.
22. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 109. Hart acknowledges that his rule of recognition resembles Kelsen's
"basic norm." Id. at 292. See also HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw 46-47 (Max Knight
trans., Univ. Calif. 1967, reprinted by Peter Smith, 1989). "The basic norm which is the
reason for the validity of the legal order, refers only to a constitution which is the basis
of an effective coercive order." Id. Hart disagrees with Kelsen's description of a legal
order as a "coercive order," arguing, as has been noted, that a legal system includes
more than coercive rules. HART, supra note 6, at n.35, n.79. Kelsen's terminology, how-
ever, can be very close to Hart's. In international law, Kelsen states, "a basic norm is
presupposed which establishes custom among states as a law-creating fact." KELSEN, Supra,
at 216 (emphasis added).
2000]
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Rules that empower certain individuals to make authoritative de-
terminations as to whether a primary rule has been broken over-
come this problem. Hart calls these rules "rules of adjudica-
tion. ' 24
Any legal system that possesses rules of adjudication neces-
sarily has a rule of recognition as well. This follows from the fact
that those empowered to make authoritative determinations as
to whether a primary rule has been violated cannot avoid em-
ploying a rule of recognition to determine whether a valid pri-
mary rule exists. 25 Rules of adjudication normally are not con-
fined to those that empower a determination regarding possible
violation of a primary rule. They also go to the question of rem-
edy and sanctions, typically curbing private vengeance. 26
c. Rules of Change
Change is slow and difficult in a system with only primary
rules. The only mode of change is evolutionary, much as
changes in manners ald etiquette are evolutionary. Courses of
conduct once thought optional may become habitual and, even-
tually, may become obligatory; conversely, deviations once dealt
with severely may become tolerated and later pass unnoticed.
But there is no means of deliberately adapting rules to changing
circumstances, either by eliminating old rules or introducing
new ones. 2 7 The process essentially is one of waiting for custom
to change.
"Rules of change" remedy this difficulty. In modern demo-
cratic municipal legal systems, legislatures typically are empow-
ered to make change. 28 At the federal level in the United States,
this is done by approval of a majority of both Houses of Congress
and by the President, or, if the President vetoes the legislation,
by an override of that veto by a two-thirds majority.29 Individuals
also are empowered, primarily through state law in the United
States, to make legally recognized and binding changes for
24. Id. at 97.
25. Id.
26. Id. "The story of the growth of courts in Athens is the story of the process
whereby private protection yielded to public jurisdiction." RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE ATHE-
NIAN REPUBLrC: DEMOCRACY OR RULE OF LAw? 113-14 (1987).
27. HART, supra note 6, at 92-93.
28. Id. at 95-96.
29. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7.
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themselves through contracts, wills, and marriages."0
As with rules of adjudication, rules of change are closely
connected with rules of recognition. Laws made by the body en-
titled by the rules of the system to effect change will be recog-
nized by those within the system that use the rules."1 Contracts,
wills, and marriages made according to the empowering rules of
the system will be recognized by those that administer and en-
force the system.32
II. HART'S VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Because international law lacks a legislature; international
courts lack compulsory jurisdiction, and they both lack a cen-
trally organized system of sanctions, Hart concludes "that the
rules for states resemble the simple form of social structure, con-
sisting only of primary rules of obligation. 31 3 Further, it is at
least arguable "that international law not only lacks the secon-
dary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legisla-
ture and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying
'sources' of law and providing for general criteria for the identi-
fication of its rules. 3 4
Hart's view of international law has been criticized as an "ex-
30. Most "empowering" law in the United States indeed is state rather than Federal
law. Among the exceptions would be instances in which the Federal Government has a
comparable role, such as in the District of Columbia.
31. HART, supra note 6, at 96.
32. Contracts, wills, and marriages are legal changes made by authorized and em-
powered individuals.
33. HART, supra note 6, at 214.
34. Id. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, however,
certainly provides "general criteria for the identification of" the rules of international
law to be applied by the Court and, in this sense at least, could be said to provide a rule
of recognition. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1),
59 stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Beavans 1179 (1945). Article 38(1) states:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law accepted by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Id. Article 59 provides that "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Id. art. 59.
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aggerated critique" that is "deeply colored by Austinian positiv-
ism."'3 5 This seems a bit off the mark, as Austin's view of law,
particularly his view of it as a series of commands, was one of the
two majorjurisprudential views criticized by Hart. 6 None of the
shortcomings of international law identified by Hart prevents it,
in his view, from properly claiming to be "law." It just means
that international law more closely resembles law in a primitive
system than law in a modern municipal system. "[O]nce we
emancipate ourselves from the assumption that international law
must contain a basic rule, the question to be faced is one of fact,"
Hart states, " [W] hat is the actual character of the rules as they
function between states?" 7
In its present stage of development, according to Hart, in-
ternational law more closely resembles municipal law in function
and content, but not in form. The form-with weak or non-exis-
tent secondary rules-is deficient, but the function is similar: to
provide legal rules. So is the content: "no other social rules are
so close to municipal law as those of international law."38
35. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 185 (1990).
36. HART, supra note 6, at 20-25. The other theory criticized by Hart was the so-
called "predictive" theory as exemplified in statements by Karl Llewellyn, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, and John Chipman Gray. See id. at 1-3. Hart may have been guilty of a
little unfair criticism himself in his references to Llewellyn, Holmes, and Gray. Llewel-
lyn, for example, used the term "concept of law" in a decidedly Hartian manner some
thirty years before Hart did; he simply did not see the merit in the exercise. "The
difficulty in framing any concept of 'law' is that there are so many things to be in-
cluded, and the things to be included are so unbelievably different from each other.
Perhaps it is possible to get them all under one verbal roof. But I do not see what you
have accomplished if you do." Karl N. Llewellyn, A RealisticJurisprudence-The Next Step,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), reprinted in KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1962).
The very existence of this Essay obviously reflects the view that Hart's effort indeed did
accomplish something. In criticizing the incompleteness of the predictive theory, how-
ever, Hart may be accused of ignoring the fact that Llewellyn, Holmes, and Gray were
not engaged in analytical jurisprudence, but were addressing practitioners and students
with rhetoric designed to reflect the "real world" of law, where, as the saying goes, "the
rubber meets the road." Scott Brewer has observed that "there is ample evidence in The
Path of the Law [Holmes' most famous statement of the "predictive theory"] that he
intended to offer the prediction thesis not as a complete jurisprudential account of the
'concept of law,' but rather as a working explanation of the law from the limited point of
view of the lawyer." Traversing Holmes'Path toward a Jurisprudence of Logical Form, in THE
PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOMES, JR., 95-
96 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (emphasis in original).
37. HART, supra note 6, at 236.
38. Id. at 237.
THE W/TO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM
III. THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
GATT, it has been said, was largely an accident. 9 It was ne-
gotiated in 1947, and was applied provisionally as of January 1,
1948, pending the anticipated creation of an International
Trade Organization ("ITO"), into which it was to be folded.4"
The proposed ITO was an ambitious undertaking, covering not
only trade, but also employment, commodity agreements, eco-
nomic development, and restrictive business practices. It was too
ambitious for the United States Congress, and in 1950, the ad-
ministration formally withdrew the ITO from Congressional con-
sideration. Without United States participation, the ITO was
dead. That left GATT, an "agreement," not an organization,
consisting of a set of primary rules and some underdeveloped
secondary rules, to apply "provisionally"-which they did, for
forty-seven years, until GATT was succeeded by the WTO on Jan-
uary 1, 1995.
A. GATT's Primary Rules
Treaty regimes are essentially regimes of primary rules, and
GATT is no exception.4 Its first three articles set forth what are
perhaps its basic "constitutional" provisions. Article I requires
parties to accord most-favored-nation ("MFN") treatment to the
products of other parties. This means that a party may not dis-
criminate among other parties to GATT by, for example, impos-
ing different tariffs on the same product, depending on its
source. Article II covers tariff binding. After tariff levels have
39. RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE, at
xxv (Columbia Univ. Press ed., 1980).
40. Id. GATT Article XXIX, "The Relation of this Agreement to the Havana Char-
ter," explicitly contemplates replacement of the former by the latter. Gardner's book,
sub-titled "The Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order," is the
authoritative history not only of the negotiations that led to the creation of GATT, but
also of those that led to the two "Bretton Woods" organizations, the International Mon-
etary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank). Other excellent sources of this history are HUDEC, supra note 4, and JOHN H.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
41. In terms of United States law, GATT was an executive agreement, not a treaty.
From the perspective of international law, however, it is a treaty, which is defined as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2.1(a) 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27. 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
20001
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been negotiated, parties bind these new rates by agreeing not to
raise them. Article III concerns national treatment. This means
that once foreign goods have cleared customs and paid whatever
tariffs are permitted under Article II, they shall be treated the
same as like domestic goods. A party may impose safety stan-
dards on imported automobiles, for example, but those stan-
dards may not be more stringent than those that apply to domes-
tically produced automobiles.
There are numerous other primary rules in GATT. The re-
maining seven of the first ten articles, for example, concern cine-
matograph films (Article IV), freedom of transit for goods (Arti-
cle V), anti-dumping and countervailing duties (Article VI), valu-
ation of goods for customs purposes (Article VII), fees and
formalities (Article VIII), marks of origin (Article IX), and publi-
cation and administration of trade regulations (Article X).
There are also many exceptions to GATT's primary obligations,
such as Article XIX, the so-called "safeguard" or "escape clause,"
which allows for the temporary imposition of additional restric-
tions on imports that cause serious injury to domestic producers,
and Article XX, which provides that GATT's primary obligations
do not prohibit measures necessary to achieve a wide variety of
public purposes, such as the protection of human, animal, or
plant life (XX(b)); the exclusion of the products of prison labor
(XX(e)); or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
(XX (g)).
GATT's primary rules were greatly increased on January 1,
1980, when some nine new "codes," covering a variety of substan-
tive areas, became effective.42 These codes, which were negoti-
ated in the Tokyo Round negotiations concluded in 1979, repre-
sented a significant departure from GATT's core MFN principle,
because they applied only to those contracting parties that chose
to adhere to them.
42. These codes included the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; Agree-
ment on Government Procurement; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII (relating to subsidies and countervailing duties); Agreement
Regarding Bovine Meat; International Dairy Agreement; Agreement on Implementa-
tion of Article VII-Protocol to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII (relat-
ing to customs valuation); Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft; and Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (relating to
antidumping). See GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 8-188 (1979).
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B. GATT's Secondary Rules
In addition to primary rules, GATT also possessed, to a de-
gree, secondary rules of the kinds enumerated by Hart: (1) rules
of recognition, (2) rules of adjudication, and (3) rules of
change.
1. Rules of Recognition
In GATT, as in any treaty regime, the ultimate rule of recog-
nition is the text of the treaty itself. The treaty alone is the
source of legal rights and obligations relating to the regime it
establishes. Indeed, it has been observed that "treaties are the
most unproblematic source of international law."43 Parties to a
treaty view it from an internal perspective. They accept its valid-
ity and look to its text, both as initially formulated and as
amended by the system's rules of change.44
The actual practice of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT
supports Hart's view that the rule of recognition in a particular
legal system is not formulated by the participants in the system;
rather, it is used by them. In the first GATT dispute-quoted at
the outset of this Essay-the question concerned the interpreta-
tion of the phrase "charges of any kind" in paragraph 1 of Article
I of GATT. That is where the inquiry began. Article I was "rec-
ognized" by the disputants, by the Chairman of the session, and
by the contracting parties, as the relevant legal rule. The obliga-
tion to comply with Article I was presupposed by all involved.
The text of GATT itself also supplies examples of what
might be called "subsidiary" rules of recognition. Article XXVI
provides for acceptance and entry into force of GATT, Article
43. ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY. COMPLI-
ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 116 (1995).
44. Just what generates an obligation to obey a treaty is a question that need not
delay this analysis. An obligation may be grounded in the principle pacta sunt ser-
vanda-agreements are to be kept-which is codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Con-
vention, but, of course, this simply pushes the question back a stage in a potentially
endless regress. Hart would avoid this difficulty by noting the fact that parties to a
treaty accept its validity and look to its text. HART, supra note 6, at 225. Were they not
to do so, the treaty effectively would be terminated. Indeed, Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention authorizes parties to a treaty to invoke the breach of the treaty by another
party as ground for termination. Kelsen notes that he abandoned the view that pacta
sunt servanda is the basis of international law because that view "can be maintained only
with the aid of the fiction that the custom established by the conduct of states is a tacit
treaty." KELSEN, supra note 23, at 216 n.80.
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XXXI for withdrawal, Article XXXII covers who is a contracting
party, Article XXXIII deals with accession to the General Agree-
ment, and Article XXXV provides for non-application of GATT
between certain contracting parties.45
Article XV(2), dealing with exchange rate arrangements,
may be viewed as an unusual rule of recognition. It provides
that the CONTRACTING PARTIES "shall accept the determination
of the [International Monetary] Fund as to whether action by a
contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the
Articles of Agreement" of the Fund. With this rule, GATT recog-
nizes the decision of another organization as its own primary
rule.
GATT's rules of recognition expanded in 1980 when the
Tokyo Round Codes became effective. Each agreement had its
own secondary as well as primary rules. As with GATT or any
treaty, the rule of recognition for each of these codes was in its
text. Each Tokyo Round code had its own provision for acces-
sion and acceptance that determined whether a contracting
party was a signatory.4 6 Parties and adjudicating panels as a mat-
ter of simple fact recognized the codes as applying to those con-
tracting parties that had accepted them and not to others.47
No provision of GATT deals explicitly with the status, as le-
gal precedent, of decisions rendered in dispute settlement pro-
ceedings and adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. These deci-
sions clearly had great influence, not only in resolving the dis-
pute at hand, but also as a form of precedent. It would be
inaccurate, however, to term these decisions as "rules" of GATT
and even more inaccurate to term them rules of recognition.
The practice of GATT, even in the absence of an explicit provi-
45. Article XXXV provides that GATT, or Part II of GATT, which contains most of
its substantive obligations, shall not apply between two parties if they have not entered
into tariff negotiations with each other and if, at the time either becomes a CON-
TRACTING PARTY, does not consent to application.
46. See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal_e/final-e.htm.
47. An interesting variation on this principle occurred in German Exchange Rate
Schemefor Deutsche Airbus, SCM/142 (Mar. 4, 1992). The case involved an exchange rate
subsidy by Germany covering exports of aircraft components to other Member States of
the European Economic Community. None of the EEC Member States was a party to
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, but the EEC was a signatory. The Panel applied the
Code to Germany. Id. See also, ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 576-78 (1993).
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sion, was consistent with Article 59 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice which provides that "l[t] he decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case." In actual practice, most of the
time, GATT dispute settlement panels have found prior reports
on the same subject highly persuasive, but that is not the same as
saying that the prior reports were binding precedent and, there-
fore, that they were looked upon as a "rule."4"
2. Rules of Adjudication
A lack of rules to determine authoritatively whether a viola-
tion has occurred is a serious defect in any legal system. For this
reason, Hart has observed, rules of adjudication are usually the
first thing added to a system of primary rules.49 GATT and the
WTO, as its successor, could serve as Exhibit A for the accuracy
of Hart's observation. It would not be inaccurate to describe the
history of the GATT/WTO system as largely the history of an
effort to remedy this defect.50
The proposed ITO Charter contained detailed dispute set-
tlement rules, and because it was anticipated that these would
soon apply, GATT's dispute settlement rules were minimal. Pri-
marily, these were GATT Articles XXII and XXIII, which were
based on two of the proposed ITO rules. They deal, respectively,
with "consultations" and with "nullification and impairment" of
benefits accruing under GATT. By itself, Article XXII has no
direct consequences; it simply requires consultations with re-
spect to any matter affecting the operation of the Agreement.
Eventually, these consultations became a basis for the generation
of GATT's dispute settlement process that was grounded in Arti-
cle XXIII, GATT's primary rule of adjudication.
Article XXIII(1) provides that if any contracting party con-
48. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETrLEMENT IN THE
WORLD. TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 38-45 (1999); David Palmeter
& Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM.J. Irr'L L. 398, 401
(1998).
49. HART, supra note 6, at 94.
50. This statement is made with regard to the GATT/WTO legal system itself. Eco-
nomically, the trade liberalization that has taken place under the auspices of GATT and
the WTO has had a positive impact of enormous proportions. Between 1950 and 1998,
the volume of world output rose by a factor of five, while the volume of world merchan-
dise exports rose by a factor of 18. See Martin Wolf, The Dangers of Protectionism, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at 21.
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siders that any benefit directly or indirectly accruing to it under
the Agreement was being nullified or impaired by another party,
it can make written representations or proposals to that other
party. If this does not lead to a satisfactory adjustment, the com-
plaining party is authorized by Article XXIII(2) to refer the mat-
ter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, who are required to investigate
and make recommendations or give a ruling, as appropriate.
The requirement that the CONTRACTING PARTIES investigate the
claim and make recommendations or give a ruling amounts to a
form of compulsory jurisdiction, something not common in in-
ternational law. This referral to the CONTRACTING PARTIES even-
tually became the Panel process.
Article XXIII(2) further permits the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to authorize the complaining party to suspend the application of
tariff concessions or other GATT obligations to the party found
to be acting inconsistent with its obligations under the Agree-
ment. This became GATT's trade "sanction" or "retaliation."
Neither Article contains specific procedures; these evolved
over time.5 Early dispute settlement reflected GATT's diplo-
matic roots. Initially, the process was even referred to as "concil-
iation," not as dispute settlement. From the beginning, with rul-
ings by the Chair, disputes later came to be referred to working
parties consisting of the complaining and responding parties,
and any others that had an interest. Eventually, the parties di-
rectly involved were dropped, and a three or five-member panel
process was adopted, using neutral panelists rather than repre-
sentatives of parties with an interest in the issue.
Still, the ability of a single party to deny consensus at each
step of the process rendered Article XXIII(2)'s apparent com-
pulsory jurisdiction largely illusory. A potential defendant-one
of the contracting parties that had to agree to consensus-could
block the process at each step. It could refuse to consult under
either Article XXII or Article XXIII. If it consulted, it could
deny consensus for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to investigate (i.e.,
to establish a panel), or it could refuse to agree to the panel's
terms of reference. If it agreed to the establishment of a panel
51. An early decision by the CONTRACTING PARTIES held that consultations under
Article XXII(1) would be considered as fulfilling the consultation requirements of Arti-
cle XXIII(1). European Free Trade Association, Nov. 18, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th
Supp.) at 20 (1961).
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and to its terms of reference, it could refuse to agree to the
membership of the panel. If it agreed to panel membership, it
could deny consensus for adoption of an adverse report by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. If it agreed to adoption of an adverse re-
port, it could deny consensus for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations.
Thus, it was not inaccurate to describe GATT dispute settle-
ment, particularly in its early years, as "primitive." The first for-
mal change in the process was not made until more than thirty
years had passed. This occurred with the adoption of the Under-
standing on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance of 28 November 1979 ("Understanding"). The Un-
derstanding included an annex setting out an Agreed Descrip-
tion of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dis-
pute Settlement as it had evolved since 1948.
Panels set up their own working procedures. The practice for
the panels has been to hold two or three formal meetings
with the parties concerned. The panel invited the parties to
present their views either in writing and/or orally in the pres-
ence of each other. The panel can question both parties on
any matter which it considers relevant to the dispute. Panels
have also heard the views of any contracting party having a
substantial interest in the matter, which is not directly party
to the dispute, but which has expressed in Council a desire to
present its views. Written memoranda submitted to the panel
have been considered confidential, but are made available to
the parties to the dispute. Panels often consult with and seek
information from any relevant source they deem appropriate
and they sometimes consult experts to obtain their technical
opinion on certain aspects of the matter. Panels may seek
advice or assistance from the secretariat in its capacity as
guardian of the General Agreement, especially on historical
or procedural aspects. The secretariat provides the secretary
and technical services for panels.
52
Three years later, acting at a Ministerial Conference, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES reaffirmed the 1979 Understanding, and
added more detail, including a requirement that "[t]he con-
52. Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of
Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII(2)), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 215, 217 (1979).
The Agreed Description and subsequent developments regarding dispute settlement in
GATT applied, mutatis mutandis, to dispute settlement under the Tokyo Round codes,
each of which had its own dispute settlement provisions.
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tracting party to which such a recommendation [i.e., to bring a
challenged measure into conformity with GATT] has been ad-
dressed, shall report within a reasonable specified period on ac-
tion taken or on its reasons for not implementing the recom-
mendation or ruling by the CONTRACTING PARTIES."'5 3 Further
minor steps were taken in Decision on Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures on November 30, 1984.54
The process continued to be handicapped, however, by the
need for consensus. It is a tribute to the system and the degree
to which the parties valued it that blocking did not occur more
often than it did. In fact, Professor Hudec's study shows that
from 1947 to 1992, the losing party eventually accepted the re-
sults of an adverse panel report in approximately ninety percent
of the cases.
An important step toward alleviating the blocking problem
was taken with the April 1989 adoption of the "Montreal Rules,"
which the CONTRACTING PARTIES agreed to apply to the end of
the then on-going Uruguay Round negotiations.56 The most sig-
nificant portions of the rules were those that (1) required con-
sultations and placed time limits on the process, (2) provided for
the automatic establishment of a panel, (3) established standard
terms of reference that would apply unless the parties agreed to
other terms, and (4) authorized the Director-General to appoint
members of the panel, at the request of a party, if the parties
could not agree on membership within twenty days of the estab-
lishment of a panel. Parties remained able, however, to block
adoption of adverse GATT panel reports and implementation of
adopted reports, thereby preventing a prevailing complaining
party from suspending concessions or other obligations under
Article XXIII(2).
While Article XXIII is the primary GATT rule of adjudica-
tion, it is not the only provision of GATT that may, at least in
broad terms, be considered a rule of adjudication. Several other
provisions call for determinations by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
53. Dispute Settlement Procedure, Nov. 30, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at
13, 15 (1983).
54. Dispute Settlement Procedure, Nov. 30, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 9
(1985).
55. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 47, at 278.
56. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12,
1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989).
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that strongly resemble adjudication although, in fact, they rarely,
if ever, have been used.
Article XII(4) (c) permits the CONTRACTING PARTIES to re-
view import restrictions imposed under Article XII for balance
of payments purposes, determine whether they damage the
trade of any contracting party and, if so, make recommendations
to the party imposing the restrictions. If the recommendations
are not accepted within a specified period, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES may release an adversely affected party from GATT obli-
gations toward the party taking the action.
Article XVIII(7) (b) authorizes the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
examine compensation offered by a developing country that is
withdrawing concessions for development purposes under Arti-
cle XVIII (4) (a). If the CONTRACTING PARTIES find the compen-
sation inadequate, adversely affected contracting parties may
modify or withdraw substantially equivalent concessions.
Article XVIII(12) (c) authorizes the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to determine whether import restrictions imposed for a variety
of developmental and balance of payments reasons damage the
trade of any contracting party and, if so, to release any adversely
affected contracting party from GATT obligations toward the
party imposing restrictions.
Article XVIII(12)(d) authorizes the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to examine import restrictions taken by developing countries for
consistency with the non-discrimination requirements of Article
XIII, and possibly to release adversely affected parties from
GATT obligations toward the party imposing restrictions.
Article XVIII(16) authorizes the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
determine whether it is practicable for a developing country,
providing assistance to promote the establishment of a particular
industry, to comply with all of its GATT obligations. If the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES agree that it is not practicable, and if they con-
cur in the proposed measure, they may release the developing
country from its GATT obligations to the extent necessary. Arti-
cle XVIII(18) provides for an off-setting release from obligations
by adversely affected parties. Article XVIII(19) requires the con-
currence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES for certain action, while
Article XVIII(21) permits action of which they "do not disap-
prove." Article XVIII(22) authorizes similar determinations by
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the CONTRACTING PARTIES involving actions taken by more ad-
vanced developing countries.
Article XIX permits contracting parties to take "emergency
action" when increased imports cause or threaten serious injury
to an industry. The party taking action is required to negotiate
compensation with adversely affected parties. If negotiations are
not successful, Article XIX(3) (a) authorizes affected parties to
take offsetting action "of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not
disapprove."
3. Rules of Change
Two ways by which change can be effected in a modern mu-
nicipal legal system are constitutional and legislative. Constitu-
tional amendment, of course, is much more difficult to accom-
plish.
From the perspective of difficulty of enactment, GATT's
provisions for amendment are a closer parallel to municipal con-
stitutional amendment than they are to ordinary legislation. Ar-
ticle XXX specifies that changes to Article I's MFN requirement,
and Article XXIX's terms relating to the relation of GATT to the
Havana Charter require unanimous acceptance. Other portions
of GATT may be amended upon acceptance by two-thirds of the
contracting parties, but only as to those contracting parties that
accept an amendment. 57 GATT in fact was amended a few times
in its earlier years, perhaps the most significant being the 1965
protocol adding Part IV on Trade and Development. Neverthe-
less, amendments were relatively rare.58
The real difficulty facing international law, however, is not
the difficulty of the occasional amendment of a constitutional
nature; it is the absence of a body able to make more frequent
changes of a legislative nature. At first glance, GATT would
seem to have overcome this problem because Article XXV allows
for voting. Paragraph 3 of Article XXV provides that each con-
tracting party shall have one vote while paragraph 4 provides
that most decisions shall be taken by a majority of votes cast.
57. This accords with Article 40.4 of the Vienna Convention, providing that an
amendment does bind parties to a multilateral treaty that do not become parties to the
amendment. Vienna Convention art. 40.4.
58. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ANALYrICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO
GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 1002-1009 (1995).
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Paragraph 5 sets forth the exception: the requirement that any
waiver of GATT obligations be approved by a two-thirds majority
of a vote of more than half of the contracting parties. In addi-
tion, Article XXXIII provides for accession to GATT by new par-
ties upon a two-thirds majority.
It all sounds very legislative. While clearly any amendments
to the text would have to comply with the requirements and limi-
tations of Articles XXIX, XXX, and XXXIII, Article XXV could
be read to permit a majority to amend other provisions. But
even if this interpretation is correct, GATT's voting rules were
one thing; its practice was another.
GATT indeed utilized its voting provisions for both waivers
and accession, but the majority vote provisions were never used.
Questions simply were not put to a formal vote, but were re-
solved by consensus or dropped.59 A former Director-General
has described the process:
The normal procedure in GATT is to avoid voting on contro-
versial matters. First, a compromise solution acceptable to all
interested parties is looked for. The general view is that, if
this fails, it is best to wait until the positions of the parties
develop sufficiently to enable them to support a decision or at
least not to oppose it. Decisions are therefore generally taken
by consensus. It means that the Chairman finds that a deci-
sion or recommendation is adopted when no delegation ob-
jects to its adoption.6°
Questions of waiver and accession, in fact, seldom were con-
tentious, for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT adhered to the
custom of negotiating extensively before bringing even these
matters to a vote. Furthermore, on questions of accession of a
new contracting party, any contracting party in the minority had
the option of utilizing the "non-application" provisions of Article
XXXV(1). 61
59. See Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 653 (1996).
60. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITs LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL SYSTEM
55 (1985).
61. GATT Article XXXV(1) states:
This Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agreement, shall not apply as
between any contracting party and any other contracting party if:
(a) the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff negotiations
with each other, and either of the contracting parties, at the time
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There are a number of other GATT articles providing for
joint action by the CONTRACTING PARTIES that permit change
with the agreement of all of the contracting parties, or at least an
absence of objection. Arguably these are rules of change, but
they add little to the analysis, given the requirement of the ab-
sence of objection. 62
Finally, the ultimate rule of change for an individual con-
tracting party lies in Article XXXI-withdrawal. This would take
effect six months after written notice to the Secretary General of
the United Nations. This step would not in any way change the
rules of GATT, but it is a step available in a treaty regime such as
GATT that has no exact municipal law counterpart. Individual
emigration is perhaps the closest municipal analog, but that ac-
tion normally would result only in an individual's trading one
municipal legal system for another, albeit one possibly more to
the emigrant's liking. A withdrawing GATT party, or any with-
drawing treaty party, however, does not necessarily move from
one treaty regime to another. National isolation is possible in a
way that individual isolation is not.
C. Summary of GATT
GATT resembled Hart's prototypical international legal sys-
tem more than it resembled a modern municipal legal system.
Its secondary rules of adjudication and change were particularly
underdeveloped compared to those that are to be found in most
municipal systems. Nevertheless, the changes made over time in
the rules of adjudication, while falling short of their municipal
counterpart, seem far more developed than those in most treaty
regimes. Not only in theory, but also for the most part in prac-
tice, jurisdiction was compulsory as, over time, the ability of a
either becomes a contracting party, does not consent to such applica-
tion.
62. These include Article XII(5) and XIV(2) (permitting a party to deviate tempo-
rarily from Article XII or XVIII requirements "with the consent of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES"), Article XVIII(4) (a) (allowing deviation from provisions of other GATT arti-
cles), Article XVIII(7) (a) (allowing possible modification of concessions by developing
countries), Article XVIII(9) (establishing limitation on imports by developing countries
to safeguard external financial position), Article XIX(1) (a) and (b) (dealing with emer-
gency action on imports), Article XXIV(10) (establishing that a two-thirds majority may
approve proposals that do not comply fully with paragraphs 5-9 of Article XXIV regard-
ing free trade areas and customs unions), and Article XXVIII (modifying of schedules).
These are mostly in the nature of waivers.
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potential defendant to deny the establishment of a dispute settle-
ment panel was eliminated. The power to block adoption of an
adverse report remained, but as time passed that power could be
exercised only at growing political cost.
IV. THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM
The Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO, in-
cludes four Annexes. The first Annex, with three parts, sets out
most of the WTO's primary rules. These are the Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods"3 (Annex IA), the General
Agreement on Trade in Services6 4 ("GATS") (Annex 1B), and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights65 ("TRIPS") (Annex IC). Most of the rules of adjudi-
cation are contained in the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes6 6 ("Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding" or "DSU") (Annex 2). The Trade Policy
Review Mechanism67 (Annex 3) contains both primary rules and
secondary rules of procedure. All WTO Members are required
to adhere to all of these agreements. There are two "plurilateral
agreements" that are optional: the Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft6" and the Agreement on Government Procurement69
(Annex 4).7 The legal texts also include more than twenty Min-
63. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex ]A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1154 (1994).
64. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, An-
nex IB, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1168
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
65. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
66. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 3, para. 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
67. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 3, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finale.htm.
68. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
4(a), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm.
69. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WVTO Agreement,
Annex 4(b), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legal_e/final-e.htm.
70. There are two other plurilateral agreements, the International Dairy Agree-
ment and the International Bovine Meat Agreement. International Dairy Agreement,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 4(c), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal_e/final_e.htm; International Bovine Meat Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
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isterial Decisions and Declarations. These Decisions and Decla-
rations are not "covered agreements" and are not directly subject
to dispute settlement. Some of them, however, could be relevant
to the interpretation of a covered agreement.
A. The WTO's Primary Rules
GATT rules were concerned exclusively with trade in goods.
The WTO, however, covers not only goods but also, as the names
of its agreements indicate, services and intellectual property. A
large number of primary WATO rules apply to these new areas.
Moreover, the WTO's coverage of trade in goods is far more de-
tailed than was GATT's. The nine Tokyo Round codes were re-
placed by fourteen separate agreements that are part of the Mul-
tilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods." In addition, the Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods includes the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 199472 ("GATT 1994"). This
consists of the complete text of the original GATT, together with
its various protocols and decisions, six Understandings on inter-
pretation of the GATT text, and a 1994 Protocol on tariff conces-
sions. By any measure, the WTO is one of the most comprehen-
sive collections of primary obligations existing in the field of
public international law.73
ment, Annex 4(d), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/final_e.htm. These
agreements were terminated on January 1, 1998.
71. Annex IA contains numerous multilateral agreements, including the Agree-
ment on Agriculture, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea-
sures [hereinafter SPS Agreement], Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agreement on Implementa-
tion of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Agree-
ment on Rules of Origin, Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, and Agreement on Safeguards. See WTO Agree-
ment, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final_
e.htm. In addition, there are the two plurilateral agreements that apply only to those
accepting them. See generally Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft Agreement; Agree-
ment on Government Procurement.
72. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1154 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
73. The official English language version of the WTO's Legal Texts encompasses
558 pages.
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B. The WTO's Secondary Rules
While the broad scope of the WTO's primary rules accounts
for its extensive economic reach and importance, its secondary
rules, particularly those of adjudication, are of equal, if not
greater, significance. Perhaps the first scholar to note the devel-
opment of Hartian secondary rules in the WTO was Celso Lafer,
then Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Brazil to the
WTO." In his 1996 Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture to the
International Law Commission, after noting the proliferation of
secondary rules in the WTO, Professor Lafer went on to coin an
extremely apt phrase to describe the legal change from GATT to
the WTO-the "thickening of legality."75 The thickening of le-
gality that took place in the transition from GATT to the WTO
included secondary as well as primary rules.
1. Rules of Recognition
In the WTO, as in GATT and all treaties, the basic rule of
recognition is the treaty text itself. The Members view this text
from an internal perspective. They see the text as applicable to
them, as providing a reason for their behavior and as providing
justification for their expectations concerning the behavior of
other Members. Their view differs radically from the external
view of a non-Member.
Article I of the WTO Agreement establishes the organiza-
tion while subsequent articles define, inter alia, its scope, func-
tions, and structure, as well as accession, acceptance, and entry
into force. The WTO's ultimate rules of recognition lie in these
provisions. Article 11(2) provides the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 ("Multilateral
Trade Agreements") are integral parts of the WTO Agreement
and binding on all members.
This language covers all of the Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods, GATS, and TRIPS. WTO Members and adjudi-
cators utilize these rules of recognition to determine authorita-
tively which of the primary rules contained in the Multilateral
Trade Agreements are relevant to their purposes. As Hart might
74. CELSO LAFER, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
18-19 (1996).
75. Id.
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say, these rules are not assumed, postulated, or hypothesized.
They are presupposed. They are used.
2. Rules of Adjudication
In the law authorizing United States participation in the
Uruguay Round, Congress listed the creation of an effective dis-
pute settlement system as one of the country's principal negotiat-
ing objectives in the Round.76 By any reasonable measure, the
results met this standard.7 7 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding, with twenty-seven sections totaling 143 paragraphs
plus four appendices, continues the pattern that began in GATT
of supplying rules of adjudication to the trading system's primary
rules. It is perhaps the most significant achievement of the Uru-
guay Round negotiations, establishing what may be the most de-
veloped dispute settlement system in any existing treaty re-
gime.78
The DSU codifies and expands upon much of the prior
GATT practice. It continues to reflect the trading system's diplo-
matic tradition by requiring consultations before a Member can
request that a panel be established. It also provides for good
offices, conciliation, and mediation. But it then moves directly
to provisions regarding the establishment of panels and their
composition, terms of reference, procedures for multiple com-
76. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1101(b) (1), 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (b) (1) (2000). The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with re-
spect to dispute settlement are to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute
settlement mechanisms and procedures and to ensure that such mechanisms within the
GATT and GATT agreements provide for more effective and expeditious resolution of
disputes and enable better enforcement of United States rights.
77. This legislation was drafted when Congress viewed the United States as an
often-aggrieved plaintiff faced with ineffective rules. By 1992, the United States had
had more experience with the process as a defendant, which led some to wonder about
the stated negotiating objectives. Senator Lloyd Bentsen, then Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, reminded his colleagues that there is a "catch" in fast and effective
dispute settlement. "The catch is this: If we want tough rules and a fast and effective
dispute settlement system when we are plaintiffs in a case, we also have to live with the
same rules when we are the defendants." 138 CONG. REc. SlII (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1992)
(comments of Senator Bentsen on the Uruguay Round).
78. See, e.g., ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAvE NEW WORLD 208 (1995). De-
spite its flaws, GATT's dispute settlement system probably merited the same characteri-
zation. One commentator noted that "GATT's focused mission and relative success
make environmentalists both angry and envious .... [W]hile denouncing the GATT,
environmentalists admire its power and would like to remold it to serve 'green' pur-
poses." DANIEL C. Esaw, GREENING THE GATT 77-78 (1994).
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plaints, and for third party participation in disputes. Other pro-
visions cover panel procedures, the right of panels to seek infor-
mation, and the maintenance of confidentiality. Appendix 3 to
the DSU sets out detailed Working Procedures for panel pro-
ceedings, including a proposed timetable for panel work.
The DSU provides for a unified dispute settlement system,
which means that cases brought under any of the WTO agree-
ments will be dealt with by the single Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB") established by the DSU. This unified system contrasts
sharply with the GATT system that prevailed after 1980 when the
Tokyo Round codes were adopted. Under that system, dispute
settlement under each code was supervised by the GATT com-
mittee concerned with the particular subject area involved, such
as dumping, subsidies, or product standards. The separate com-
mittees themselves established panels and considered and
adopted reports, a practice that, at a minimum, invited forum
shopping. Under the WTO the forum shopping issue is avoided
because the DSB administers all dispute settlement proceedings,
regardless of subject matter.79
There do remain, however, some procedural differences de-
pending upon which WTO agreement is the subject of the dis-
pute. Six of the goods agreements, as well as GATS and TRIPS,
include special or additional provisions that cover some aspects
of dispute settlement.8 0 To the extent that there is a difference
between the DSU and the special or additional rules in the sepa-
rate agreements, the latter prevail.8 ' These special and addi-
tional rules for the most part substitute for specific provisions of
the DSU in a very limited way. For example, Article 4 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provides
procedural deadlines for disputes involving alleged prohibited
subsidies that generally are half those of the DSU;8 2 Article 14 of
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides that an
annex to the agreement governs the procedures that apply to
79. When a plurilateral agreement is involved, only those Members that are parties
to the agreement may participate in DSB consideration of the dispute. See DSU art. 2.1.
80. These provisions are the SPS Agreement, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of GATT 1994, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, and
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
81. See DSU art. 1.2.
82. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties art. 4.
2000]
470 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:444
technical expert groups established to assist panels;8 3 and Article
17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT
1994 contains specific jurisdictional and standard of review pro-
visions for antidumping disputes.8 4
Two particularly significant aspects of the DSU, applicable
to all disputes are (1) the effective abolition of the power- of the
losing party to block adoption of a report and (2) the establish-
ment of a standing Appellate Body to hear appeals of questions
of law in panel reports.
While the DSB must adopt reports in order for them to be
"official," the DSU reverses GATT's consensus requirements. In
GATT, consensus for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to adopt a report
could be denied by a single objection. In the WTO, however, a
report will be adopted unless the DSB decides by consensus not
to do so.85 Since this "negative consensus" will require the acqui-
escence of the prevailing party, it will occur rarely if ever. Of
course, if a panel report is appealed, it will not be adopted until
the appellate process is complete.86 The innovative step of ad-
ding an appeal to the dispute settlement process was taken in
response to the need to ensure the quality of adopted reports
once it was agreed to eliminate the affirmative consensus re-
quirement.8 7
The WTO Appellate Body has no real international counter-
part, since virtually all international tribunals are the equivalent
of municipal courts of original jurisdiction that decide both
questions of fact and questions of law and from which no appeal
can be taken. This is true even of the International Court ofJus-
tice.
The Appellate Body is more than a higher level WTO panel
in a number of ways. It is a standing group whose seven Mem-
bers serve a four-year term and are eligible for reappointment
once. Panelists, in contrast, are selected, as they were under
GATT, on an ad hoc basis. Appellate Body Members are not affil-
iated with any government, whereas most panelists are present
83. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 14.
84. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 art. 17.
85. DSU art. 16.4.
86. Id.
87. See generally JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 264-68
(1995); HuGo PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO 161-63,
255-56 (1995).
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or former government officials, frequently Geneva-based dele-
gates to the WTO. 8 While panelists serve in their individual ca-
pacities, governmental panelists-particularly those based in Ge-
neva-are very much a part of the on-going diplomatic work of
the WTO."9 Appellate Body Members have no other WTO re-
sponsibilities. With the establishment of the Appellate Body, the
WTO has added an important characteristic of all modern mu-
nicipal legal systems, the separation of the judicial power from
the policy-making power. 90
Hart cited international law's lack of an organized system of
sanctions as a deficiency in the system.91 The presence of trade
sanctions in the WTO, however, is something that has been cited
by opponents of the multilateral system as a threat to sovereignty
and something that has attracted many in the environmental
community who wish to utilize the system for their own pur-
poses.92 While trade sanctions may make adjudication in the
WTO more effective than adjudication in other treaty regimes,
the "remedy" or "sanctions" available in the WTO are far more
limited than those available in a modern municipal system.
When a WTO Member fails to bring a measure found to be
inconsistent with a WTO agreement into compliance with that
agreement, the complaining party will be authorized by the DSB
"to suspend the application to the Member concerned of conces-
sions or other obligations under the covered agreements. '
The level of suspension of concessions or other obligations au-
thorized by the DSB is the "equivalent" of the trade damage-
called "nullification and impairment"-experienced by the com-
plaining Member.94 In other words, if the complaining Mem-
88. In recent years, an increasing number of academics also have served as panel-
ists.
89. The qualifications and responsibilities of panelists are set out in Article 8 of the
DSU.
90. Sealey, supra note 26, at 140. One of the most important achievements of the
Athenians in establishing the rule of law was the creation of "a judiciary independent of
the organs which made policy." Id.
91. HART, supra note 6, at 96.
92. As to the former, see, e.g., ALFRED E. ECKEs, JR., OPENING AMERICA'S MARKET:
U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY SINCE 1776 284 (1995); as to the latter, see EsTv, supra note
78.
93. DSU art. 22.2.
94. Id. art. 22.4. In the case of prohibited subsidies, Article 4.10 of the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provides that the complaining Member may
take "appropriate countermeasures" if the responding Member does not "withdraw" the
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ber's trade is adversely affected by US$100 million, it may im-
pose restrictions on the trade of the offending Member amount
to US$100 million. In a practical sense, this amounts to a partial
rescission of a contract. It is a limited remedy.
The effectiveness of the remedy is compromised by the fact
that, from an economic viewpoint, it is the equivalent of a self-
inflicted wound. To be sure, trade restrictions impose a cost on
firms and workers in the exporting country, but they also impose
a cost on consumers and importers in the importing country.
This undeniable fact can impose a political as well as economic
cost on the Member imposing the sanction.
This point is related to an important factual distinction be-
tween municipal legal systems and virtually any international sys-
tem, including the WTO-the individuals that comprise a mu-
nicipal legal system are relatively similar in size and strength, as
compared to the great disparity in the size and strength of the
nations that are the subjects of international law. "[I] t is a fact of
quite major importance for the understanding of different forms
of law and morality," Hart states, "that no individual is so much
more powerful than others, that he is able, without co-operation,
to dominate or subdue them for more than a short period."9
On the other hand, inequality "between units of international
law is one of the things that has imparted to it a character so
different from municipal law and limited the extent to which it is
capable of operating as an organized coercive system."9
Hart goes on to observe that "[tihis fact of approximate
equality, more than any other, makes obvious the necessity of a
system of mutual forbearance and compromise which is the base
of both legal and moral obligation."97 This is of crucial impor-
tance in a system of organized sanctions.
[I]f some men were vastly more powerful than others, and so
subsidy; in the case of so-called "actionable" subsidies, the complaining Member is au-
thorized by Article 7.8 to take countermeasures if the responding party does not pursu-
ant to Article 7.8 withdraw the subsidy or remove the adverse effects caused by the
subsidy. Id.
95. HART, supra note 6, at 195.
96. Id.
97. Id. Enactment of the antitrust laws in the United States in the late 19th and
early 20th Centuries might be looked upon as an effort to prevent some individuals in
the legal system-in this case, corporations-from becoming too large and too powerful
relative to the other individuals-both persons and smaller organizations-in the legal
system. There obviously is no international counterpart. Id.
THE WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM
not dependent on their forbearance, the strength of the
malefactors might exceed that of the supporters of law and
order. Given such inequalities, the use of sanctions could not
be successful and would involve dangers at least as great as
those that they were designed to suppress. In these circum-
stances, instead of social life being based on a system of mu-
tual forbearances, with force used only intermittently against
a minority of malefactors, the only viable system would be one
in which the weak submitted to the strong on the best terms
they could make and lived under their 'protection.'98
There is clearly an element of this in the WTO, which is
reflected in the relative ability of Members to impose sanctions
on others and accept the cost of doing so. It is one thing for a
major economy such as the United States or the European
Union to impose restrictions on imports from a smaller Mem-
ber, it is something else for the smaller Member to do so to the
United States or the European Union. 9 Consider one of the
early WTO disputes involving restrictions imposed by the United
States on imports of textile products from Costa Rica.' 00 Costa
Rica prevailed in that dispute, and the United States brought the
offending measure into conformity with its WTO obligations,
but certainly not because it feared trade sanctions from Costa
Rica. Moreover, if the United States had refused to bring its
measure into conformity, any retaliatory action Costa Rica could
have taken more than likely would have had a greater impact on
Costa Rica than on the United States. If the situation had been
reversed, however, if it had been Costa Rica that had refused to
bring an offending measure into compliance, the United States
could have taken action that would have had far more impact on
the smaller Costa Rican economy than it had on the United
States.
The WTO quite obviously has not escaped the problems at-
98. Id. at 198.
99. Ecuador faced this problem when it was authorized to suspend concessions as a
result of the European Communities' restrictions on imports of bananas. Ecuador ar-
gued that suspension of concessions with regard to goods was impracticable and asked
for authorization to take action against European services and intellectual property
rights. The request was granted in part. European Communities-Regime for the Importa-
tion, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Recourse to Arbitration by the European Commu-
nities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
100. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear,
Panel Report, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996).
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tendant to the disparity in the relative size and strength of its
Members that Hart has observed in international law generally,
nor is it likely to do so. Nevertheless, it seems more than fair to
say that, in agreeing to the DSU, the Uruguay Round negotia-
tors, consciously or not, took to heart Thomas Franck's observa-
tion that "[o]nly an international law which is subject to case-by-
case interpretation via a credible third-party decision-making
process is a serious norm."1' They avoided the problem, noted
by James Crawford as an increasing one in international law, "of
the formulation of ever more complex rules in the absence of
proper procedures for dispute settlement.' 10 2
3. Rules of Change
The WTO's rules of change are more complex and more
elaborate than those of GATT, but it remains to be seen whether
its practice will be any different. The two most important are
Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement, which deal with Deci-
sion-Making and Amendments, respectively.
Article IX(l) makes GATT's consensus practice explicit at
the outset that "[t]he WTO shall continue the practice of deci-
sion-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947." Foot-
note 1 to this sentence clarifies what is meant by "consensus" in
the WTO: "[t]he body concerned shall be deemed to have de-
cided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration,
if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is
taken, formally objects to the proposed decision."
Paragraph 1 of Article IX goes on to state that where a deci-
sion cannot be arrived at by consensus, it shall be decided by
vote with each Member having a single vote. Present indications
are that the organization will continue to follow GATT practice
and rely on consensus in virtually all matters, but there are pres-
sures pushing in the opposite direction. The larger membership
of the WTO makes consensus more difficult to achieve. Moreo-
ver, developing countries are increasingly unwilling to let the
"quad"-Canada, the EC, Japan, and the United States-decide
issues privately among themselves, and then present their joint
101. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 317
(1995).
102. James Crawford, Democracy in International Law, remarks at the Whewell
Professorship Inaugural Lecture (Mar. 5, 1993).
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positions for uncritical acceptance by other Members. 0 3 Diffi-
culties experienced in selecting a successor to Director-General
Renato Ruggerio led to consideration of voting to break the im-
passe.104
But while Article IX (1) specifies that the WTO shall follow
GATT's practice of decision-making by consensus, Article IX(3)
provides for waiver of WTO obligations by a decision taken by
three-fourths of the Members, and Article XII(2) calls for a two-
thirds vote for accession of new members. This apparent dis-
crepancy was addressed by the WTO's General Council, which-
after "prolonged and wide-ranging consultations on this mat-
ter"-agreed to a statement by the Chair to clarify the proce-
dure.0 5 The General Council agreed that, with regard to re-
quests for waivers or accessions to the WTO under Articles IX or
XII, it will seek a decision by consensus in accordance with Arti-
cle IX(l). When a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus,
however, the matter shall be decided by voting. Consensus
would be assumed in the absence of objection. The decision
concludes:
Consequently, if any Member has a particular problem with a
proposed decision regarding a request for a waiver or an ac-
cession to the WTO, it should ensure its presence at the meet-
ing in which this matter will be considered. The absence of a
Member will be assumed to imply that it has no comments on
or objections to the proposed decision on the matter.'0 6
An interesting issue is presented by Article IX(2), which
makes explicit the WTO's power to adopt, by a three-fourths ma-
jority, interpretations of the WTO Agreement itself and of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. This power was only implicit in
GATT.' °7 The last sentence of the paragraph limits this power in
103. See, e.g., EU Council Calls for Report on Seattle Proposals on Rules Changes, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Dec. 10, 1999, at 11-12.
104. See WTO Members Begin Informal Discussion of Director General Vote, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 21, 1999, at 1-3 (indicating that Director-General Designate Supachai
Panitchpakdi might go further); Future W'O Chief Sees Voting as Alternative to Consensus
Decisions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 29, 2000, at 9-10.
105. WTO General Council: Minutes of Meeting of 15 November 1995, WT/GC/M/8
(Dec. 13, 1995).
106. Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WrO Agreement, WT/
L/93 (Nov. 24, 1995).
107. See, JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 123-24 (2d ed. 1997).
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a way that is not totally clear. "This paragraph," it provides,
"shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the
amendment provisions of Article X." John H. Jackson has noted
that a definitive interpretation under Article IX(2) presumably
binds all Members "irrevocably, as a matter of treaty text law."' '
The line between a definitive interpretation and amendment
might not always be easy to draw.
Article X sets out rules for amendment that are more com-
plex and far-reaching than those of GATT. Paragraph 1 of Arti-
cle X initially specifies that a decision even to submit a proposed
amendment to the Members shall itself be taken by consensus.
If consensus is not reached within a specified period, the deci-
sion whether to submit a proposed amendment shall be taken by
a two-thirds majority of the Members. If the two-thirds majority
decides to submit the amendment to the Members, paragraph 3
provides that, in most circumstances, if two-thirds accept, the
amendment shall take effect as to those that have accepted it.
Paragraph 3 of Article X then specifies:
[T] he Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths
majority of the Members that any amendment made effective
under this paragraph is of such a nature that any member
which has not accepted it within a period specified by the
Ministerial Conference in each case shall be free to withdraw
from the WTO or to remain a Member with the consent of
the Ministerial Conference.
This sentence goes far beyond any provision of GATT. It means
that three-fourths of the Members may compel the remaining
fourth to accept an amendment that would affect their rights or
obligations or leave the organization.
This rather extraordinary power does not extend to all
WTO provisions, however. Article X(2) provides that amend-
ments to Article X itself shall take effect only upon "acceptance"
by all Members. The same is true of Article IX (Decision-Mak-
ing), as well as Articles I and II of GATT 1994 (MFN and tariff
binding, respectively), Article 11(1) of GATS (MFN), and Article
4 of the TRIPS Agreement (also MFN).
Article X(4) concludes the general amending authority by
providing that amendments "of a nature that would not alter the
108. Id.
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rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for all
Members upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members."
The power of a three-fourths majority under paragraph 3
effectively to impose its will on the remaining minority and the
power of a two-thirds majority under paragraph 4 to impose its
will on all Members, even of amendments that would not alter
the rights and obligations of the minority, might appear to be
inconsistent with Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which provides that amendments to multilateral
treaties do not bind parties to the treaty that do not become a
party to the amending agreement. The Vienna Convention,
however, is a codification of customary international law that
may be superseded by treaty law. 10 The Members of the WTO
have agreed to these provisions and are therefore bound by
them.110
Paragraph 5 of Article X applies to GATS. It specifies that,
except for the MFN requirement of Article 11(1) (which is cov-
ered by paragraph 2), amendments to the first three parts of
GATS-dealing with scope and definition, general obligations
and disciplines, and specific commitments-and their respective
annexes shall take effect for the Members that have accepted
them upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members. It also
provides, parallel to paragraph 3, that the Ministerial Confer-
ence may decide by a three-fourths majority that an amendment
is of such importance that Members not accepting it shall be free
to withdraw or may remain only with the consent of the Ministe-
rial Conference.
Article 71.2 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that amend-
ments to the agreement that merely adjust to higher levels of
protection of intellectual property rights in other multilateral
agreements that are accepted under those agreements by all
Members of the WTO may be referred to the Ministerial Confer-
ence for action under Article X(6) of the WTO Agreement. Par-
agraph 6 of Article X merely provides that amendments meeting
the requirements of Article 71.2 of the TRIPS Agreement may be
109. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57 (1963).
110. Articles X(3) and X(4) clearly do not conflict with a peremptory norm of
international law (Jus cogens) and are therefore not invalid for that reason. See Vienna
Convention art. 53.
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adopted by the Ministerial Conference without further formal
acceptance process.
Article X(10) of the WTO Agreement provides that amend-
ments to the plurilateral trade agreements shall be governed by
the provisions of those agreements. Article XXIV(9) of the
Agreement on Government Procurement allows for amendment
"in accordance with the procedures established" by the Commit-
tee on Government Procurement; that amendment shall not
enter into force for any party to the Agreement until that party
has accepted it. Article 9.5.1 of the Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft contains a comparable provision. Article X(9) provides
for the addition of new plurilateral agreements, upon the re-
quest of Member parties to them, and for the deletion of ex-
isting plurilateral agreements upon request of the Members.
These decisions require consensus of the Ministerial Confer-
ence.
Article X(8) covers amendments to the DSU and the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM"). Decisions to approve
amendments to these instruments shall be taken by consensus
and are effective for all Members upon approval by the Ministe-
rial Conference. Just how difficult this can be in practice is illus-
trated by the effort to review the DSU. The Uruguay Round
Negotiators agreed to review the DSU within four years after the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement "and to take a decision
on the occasion of its first meeting after completion of the re-
view, whether to continue, modify or terminate such dispute set-
tlement rules and procedures.""' The deadline for action was
December 31, 1998, but to date the Members have been unable
to agree.' 1 2
CONCLUSION
The question asked at the outset of this Essay was whether
the WTO legal regime more closely resembles a primitive or a
modern municipal legal system. It is not an easy question to an-
swer and, perhaps, cannot be answered in a meaningful way.
11. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol.
1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
112. See, e.g., Official Says WTO Members Still Disagree On How to Disagree in Resolving
Disputes, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 28, 1999, A-11.
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The dispute settlement system of GATT has been described as
the most developed and active of all international regimes, and
the WTO-with its thickening of legality-has taken the trading
regime's legal system far beyond GATT." 3 Its rules of adjudica-
tion are anything but primitive, and closely resemble the rules of
adjudication in modern municipal systems, particularly adminis-
trative rules of adjudication. A United States lawyer, familiar
with the practice of Federal administrative law and judicial re-
view of agency decisions, would be more than comfortable in the
WTO system. True, as with international law generally, an exclu-
sively common law approach to WTO law would be insufficient;
some familiarity with the approach of civilian lawyers to the anal-
ysis and resolution of legal disputes is highly desirable. Still, the
similarities with the United States legal system are strong.
While the WTO's adjudicatory machinery resembles very
much the machinery of a modern municipal legal system, in
other areas it shares the difficulties of the broader field of inter-
national law. The WTO legal system has not escaped the
problems that accompany great disparities in size and power
among its Members, nor is it likely to do so. Perhaps more im-
portant, it effectively lacks a legislature. John Chipman Gray ob-
served that a state can create legal rights for itself by enacting
new laws, but an individual cannot." 4 The WTO is not a state
and lacks the power to create legal rights. Only the "individuals"
that compose the WIG-its governmental Members-may do
that, and they may do so only through the WTO's rules of
change, rules that intentionally make change difficult to accom-
plish. The WTO does not resemble a representative govern-
ment; it resembles a direct democracy with an effective require-
ment of unanimity.
The difficulty of change may itself be related to the sophisti-
cation of the adjudicatory system. Clearly WTO Members-who
comprise most of the world's governments-have seen fit to cre-
ate and submit to a far more developed legal system in the WTO
than they are willing to create and submit to in other areas. The
WTO, however, is confined to one narrow area of human activ-
113. "Of all the international regimes, the GATT has the most developed and most
active system of formal dispute settlement." ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYxs, supra note 43, at 218.
114. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 81, 83 (Peter
Smith ed., 1972) (1921).
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ity: trade. While its trade coverage has expanded beyond goods
to include services and intellectual property, issues of high pol-
icy, of war and peace, and of national security are not part of the
WTO system.' 1
5
The WTO's limited subject-matter jurisdiction is combined
with a limited remedy. If a measure is found not to conform to a
WTO agreement, the Member concerned is called upon to bring
the measure into compliance; if the Member concerned fails to
do so, the complaining Member may suspend concessions or
other WTO obligations equivalent to the level injury caused by
the violation.1 16 The process very much resembles partial rescis-
sion of a contract based on a partial breach by another party.'
1 7
The effect resembles a return to the status quo ante. Neither spe-
cific performance nor monetary damages is an available remedy.
"However it may arise," Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes
have written, "a dispute between nations turns out in the end to
be about the exercise of sovereign power, always a delicate mat-
ter and hard to resolve within the winner-take-all framework of
adjudication." 1 " GATT and the WTO, however, regularly re-
solve disputes in a winner-take-all framework. The fact that gov-
ernments have agreed to the establishment of a legal system that
will do this routinely no doubt reflects the limited subject-matter
jurisdiction they have assigned to the WTO and the limited rem-
edy they have made available.
It also reflects the confidence governments developed in
the system as it has evolved from that first ruling of the Chair in
August 1948. The half-century plus since that ruling has wit-
nessed the birth and development of a legal system that, while it
inevitably shares many of the characteristics of international law
generally, is by any reasonable measure very far from primitive.
115. GATT Article XXI provides a national security exception to GATT obliga-
tions.
116. See DSU art. 22.2, 22.4. In the case of certain subsidies, the Member con-
cerned is called upon to "withdraw the subsidy" or remove any adverse effects it may
cause. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 4.7, 7.8.
117. On rescission see ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1964).
118. ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAVES, supra note 43, at 205.
